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Geoffrey J. Butler 
Court Clerk 
Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
LED 
S£P\ 1989 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
Re: Amax Magnesium Corporation v. Utah State Tax 
Commission 
Civil No- 88-0251 Priority 14A ?#DTS\ 
Dear Mr- B u t l e r : 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has recently decided a 
case entitled Northern Natural Gas Company and Enron Liquids 
Pipeline Company v- State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 
Tax 88-706 (July 14, 1989). As Amicus Curiae in Amax v. 
Commission, the Utah Mining Association, believes that the 
Nebra 
Court 
Nebraska case are enclosed for the Court's convenience. 
ska case is relevant to the issues before the Utah Supreme 
in the above-captioned Amax appeal. Six copies of the 
The Utah Mining Association understands that a Motion 
for Reconsideration of the Supreme Court of Nebraska's decision 
is pending before that Court. 
Yours sincerely, 
4&, 
Kent W. Winterholler 
Attorney for Utah Mining 
Association Amicus Curiae 
KWW:sp 
Enclosures 
nn: Mark Buchi (w/encl.) 
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEBRASKA 
Case TJtjg 
Northern Natural Gas Company and Enron Liquids 
Pipeline Company, Appellants, 
v. 
State Board of Equalization and Assessment, Appellee. 
Case Caption 
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Bd. of Equal. 
Filed Julv 14, 1989. No. 88-706. 
Appeal from the State Board of Equalization and Assessment. 
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
John K. Boyer, Norman H. Wright, and Amy S. Bones, of Fraser, 
Stryker, Vaughn, Meusey, Olson, Boyer & Bloch, P.C., for 
appellants. 
Robert M. Spire, Attorney General, and L. Jay Bartel for 
appellee. 
NORTHERN NATURAL GAS CO- V. STATE BD. OF EQUAL. 
NO. 88-706 - filed July 14, 1989. 
1. State Equalization Board: Appeal and Error. Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§ 77-510 (Cum- Supp. 1988) provides that any person, county, or 
municipality affected by a final decision of the State Board of 
Equalization and Assessment may prosecute an appeal to the Supreme 
Court. 
2. Administrative Law: Appeal and Error. When an appeal from an 
administrative agency is not taken pursuant to the Administrative 
Procedure Act because of a special statute, the standard of review 
in this court, is to search only for errors appearing in the record; 
i.e., whether the decision conforms to law, is supported by 
competent and relevant evidence, and was not arbitrary, capricious, 
or unreasonable. 
3. State Equalization Board: Taxation: Valuation. The State 
Board of Equalization and Assessment has a wide latitude of 
judgment and discretion in equalizing assessment of property. 
4* : : . The State Board of Equalization and 
Assessment acts in a quasi-judicial capacity when equalizing 
property. 
5. Appeal and Error. In instances where the Supreme Court is 
required to review a case for error appearing in the record, 
questions of law are nonetheless reviewed de novo on the record. 
6. State Equalization Board: Taxation: Valuation: Appeal and 
Error. In an application before the State Board of Equalization 
and Assessment, a taxpayer may employ any factual or legal argument 
subject to the final determination of questions of law on a de novo 
basis by this court on appeal. 
7.
 m: : : . When the State Board of 
Equalization and Assessment arbitrarily undervalues a particular 
class of property so as to make another class of property 
disproportionately higher, or achieves the same result because of 
legislative action, the Supreme Court must correct that 
constitutional inequity by lowering the complaining taxpayer's 
valuation to such an extent as to equalize it with other property 
in the state. 
8. State Equalization Board: Taxation: Federal Acts: Equal 
Protection. The State Board of Equalization and Assessment, by not 
taxing the personal property of certain property in a class, 
although acting involuntarily and under compulsion of federal law, 
nevertheless, by complying with that mandate, has denied another 
taxpayer in that same class the equal protection of the law 
contrary to the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. 
9. Constitutional Law: Taxation: Valuation. The right of a 
taxpayer whose property alone is taxed at 100 percent of its true 
value is to have his, her, or its assessment reduced to the 
percentage of that value at which others are taxed even though this 
is a departure from the requirement of statute. 
10. : : . Where it is impossible to secure both the 
standard of the true value, and the uniformity and equality 
required by law, the latter requirement is to be preferred as the 
just and ultimate purpose of law. 
11. Taxation: Property: Words and Phrases. For tax purposes in 
Nebraska, personal property includes all property other than real 
property and franchises. 
12. Property: Appurtenances: Intent. To determine whether an 
i f . constitutes a fixture, this court looks at three (actors:
 (1, 
actual annexation to the realty, or something appurtenant thereto, 
(2) appropriation to the use or purpose or that part of the realty 
with which it is connected, and (3) the intention of the party 
making the annexation to make the article a permanent accession to 
the freehold. 
13. : :
 • Of the three factors determining whether 
an item constitutes a fixture, the most important is the intention 
to make the article a permanent accession to the freehold. 
14. : : • The intention of the party making the 
annexation can be inferred from the nature of the articles affixed, 
the relation and situation of the party making the annexation, the 
structure and mode of annexation, and the purpose or use for which 
the annexation has been made. 
15. Property: Appurtenances. In considering the issue of 
annexation, an important factor is whether removal of the article 
will injure the realty or will injure the article itself. 
16. : . If a chattel is a necessary or useful adjunct 
to the realty, then it may be said generally to have been 
appropriated to the use or purpose of the realty to which it was 
affixed. 
17. Constitutional Law: Taxation: Valuation. Although the 
taxing authorities may classify different types of property for 
taxation purposes, nevertheless, the results reached by such 
different methods and reasonable classifications must be correlated 
so that the valuations reached shall be unifora and 
proportionate. 
Hastings, C.J., Boslaugh, White, Caporale, Shanahan, Grant, 
and Fahrnbruch, JJ. 
HASTINGS, C,J. 
This is an appeal by Northern Natural Gas Company and Enron 
Liquids Pipeline Company (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
Enron) from a decision of the Nebraska state Board of Equalization 
and Assessment (the Board) with respect to a request made by Enron 
for equalization of centrally assessed property. 
Enron appealed directly to this court pursuant to Neb. Rev. 
Stat. § 77-510 (Cum. Supp. 1988), which provides in part: "From 
any final decision of the State Board of Equalization and 
Assessment with respect to the valuation of any real or personal 
property, any person, county, or municipality affected thereby may 
prosecute an appeal to the Supreme Court." 
Since appeal was not taken pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§ 84-918 (Reissue 1987) of the Administrative Procedure Act, this 
court's standard of review is not de novo on the record. This 
cou-t has decided that when the Administrative Procedure Act is 
inapplicable because another method of appeal has been prescribed, 
the standard of review will be to search only for errors appearing 
in the record; i.e., whether the decision conforms to law, is 
supported by competent and relevant evidence, and was not 
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. In re Application A-15738. 
226 Neb. 146, 410 N.W.2d 101 (1987) (direct appeal to the Supreme 
Court from the Department of Water Resources); Banner County v. 
State Bd. of Equal.. 226 Neb. 236, 411 N.W.2d 35 (1987). 
The disputes involved in this appeal arose in part as a result 
of three cases which were decided by the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Nebraska: Trailer Train Co. et al. v. Leuenbpr^^ 
No. CV87-L-29 (D. Neb. Dec. 11, 1987), aff'4 No. 88-1118 (8th Cir. 
Dec. 19, 1988), cert, denied. Boehm v. Trailer Train Co. et * ] .
 r 
U.S. , S. Ct. , 104 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1989); Burlinaf.n^ 
Northern RR. Co. et al. v. Leuenbercxer, No. CV87-L-565 (D. Neb. 
Dec. 10, 1987); and Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. et al. v. 
r^euenberaer. No. CV88-L-52 (D. Neb. Jan. 26, 1988). 
The plaintiffs in Trailer Train were car companies that 
furnish railcars to railroads. Their only relationship to Nebraska 
stems from the fact that their railcars are located or operated in 
Nebraska by.the railroads. The federal district court held that 
the assessment of the plaintiffs1 personal property and the 
imposition, levy, or collection of any personal property taxes 
against the plaintiffs pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 77-624 et 
seq. (Reissue 1986) violates § 306(1)(d) of the Railroad 
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (the 4-R Act) , and 
permanently enjoined the imposition, levy, and collection of any 
personal property taxes from the plaintiffs. On appeal, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the 
levy and collection of Nebraska's ad valorem tax on car company 
property violated the 4-R Act. 
The plaintiffs in Burlington Northern RR. Co. were several of 
the railroads that do business in Nebraska. The federal district 
court preliminarily enjoined and restrained the collection of ad 
valorem property tax payments for tax year 1987 on that portion of 
plaintiffs' operating property that consists of personal property. 
The court issued the preliminary injunction after finding 
reasonable cause to believe that the personal property tzx levied 
on the plaintiffs results in'.discriminatory treatment of common 
carriers by railroad, in violation of § 306(1)(d) of the 4-R Act. 
The plaintiffs in Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. were carlir.es 
doing business in Nebraska. The federal district court enjoined 
distribution of the Nebraska carline tax for the 1987 tax year, 
finding reasonable cause to believe that the tax violates § 3 06 of 
the 4-R Act, 
The result in each case was reached through application of 
the 4-R Act, a federal statute. To prevent the unreasonable 
burdening of interstate commerce that results from discriminatory 
state and local taxation of rail carrier property, Congress enacted 
the 4-R Act, Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 54, § 306 (codified at 
49 U.S.C. § 26c (1976); recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1982) in 
accordance with the revised Interstate Commerce Act of 1978) . 
At issue in Trailer Train was whether Nebraska's personal 
property taxation system, which provides for extensive exemptions 
from personal property tax under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-202 (Supp. 
1987), violates § 306(1)(d) of the 4-R Act, which prohibits the 
imposition of any tax which results in discriminatory treatment of 
a common carrier by railroad. The federal district court found 
that the Nebraska system of taxation did violate the federal 
statute. According to the court, 
Under the Nebraska scheme, the majority of the personal 
property in the state is statutorily exempted from taxation, 
while a minority of personal property, including all the 
property that belongs to Trailer Train in the state, is 
subject to an ad valorem tax on its actual value. . . . [T]he 
Nebraska system favors a majority of the property of possible 
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taxpayers by exempting that property from taxation but denies 
the property of rail car lines the same favorable treatment. 
Trailer Train, supra, slip. op. at 6. The court further found that 
the actual result of Nebraska's taxation scheme is an unfair and 
discriminatory tax burden on the railroads. 
In light of the federal district court's rulings in the three 
cases discussed above, Enron submitted a request with the Board 
asking that its unit values be equalized with the railroads and car 
companies doing business in Nebraska, i.e., that the portion of the 
unit value that is comprised of personal property be disregarded 
in determining the amount of property tax it owes .to the state. 
In conjunction with this request, Enron also sought a determination 
that its pipelines constitute personal property. 
Enron is a public service entity within the meaning of Neb. 
Rev. Stat. § 77-801 (Reissue 1986). Northern Natural Gas, a 
division of Enron Corporation, owns, maintains, and operates a gas 
pipeline system in Nebraska. Enron Liquids, a subsidiary of Enron 
Corporation, owns, maintains, and operates a liquid hydrocarbon 
pipeline in Nebraska. Enron's property is centrally assessed by 
the state for property tax purposes through the Tax Commissioner 
rather than county assessors, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-802 
(Cum. Supp* 1988). 
To establish the value of a centrally assessed taxpayer, the 
Department of Revenue uses a methodology known as "unit value." 
Rather than valuing individual items of property owned by such a 
taxpayer, the department values the property of the taxpayer as a 
total unit. Dennis Donner, the central assessment manager of the 
Department of Revenue, explained the unit value method at the 
Board's August 2, 1988, hearing: 
These- values are derived by use of the unit value concept, 
which is a valuation of the company as a going concern, as 
opposed to just a simple summary of the assets of the company. 
The Department uses the traditional three approaches to value, 
that being the market[,] income and cost approach in 
developing these values, and then it correlates the results 
into an indication of value for the company. This value is 
then allocated to the state of Nebraska, based on varying 
factors, depending on which particular industry we're 
referring to. 
Once the department has calculated the unit value of the 
centrally assessed taxpayer and determined what pozrtion of that 
value should be taxed by Nebraska, the Tax Commissioner apportions 
the total taxable value to all taxing subdivisions in which 
property of the taxpayer is located and certifies to the county 
assessors the value so determined. § 77-802. 
During the August 2, 1988, hearing, the Board dismissed 
Enron's request for equalization with the railroads and car 
companies doing business in Nebraska. Additionally, the Board 
decided to equalize Enron's property, and all other centrally 
assessed property, through application of a statewide "aggregate 
level of assessment" determined by the Department of Revenue to be 
8 8.7 percent of actual value. The department first calculated the 
average ratio of assessed value to actual value for all classes of 
tangible property: residential (improved and unimproved), 
commercial and industrial (improved and unimproved), agricultural 
(improved and unimproved), personal, and centrally assessed. Then 
the department aggregated the average ratios to arrive at the 88.7 
percent figure. 
At the Board1s August 2, 1988, hearing, Enron objected to 
being equalized with the statewide "aggregate level of assessment" 
of 88.7 percent of value. In dismissing the matter, the Board 
stated in its order: 
[T]he uncontraverted [sic] evidence shows that all property 
valued by the state, including the property of Enron, is at 
100 percent of value; that said property is equalized to che 
same level of value as all property valued by the state that 
being the aggregate level of value for all tangible property 
in this state; and, that the State Board has properly 
fulfilled its duty to equalize all the tangible property in 
the state. 
Enron argues before this court that its property should be assessed 
at 73.7 percent of actual value, the aggregate level at which 
unimproved agricultural land is being valued in this state. 
Since the perfection of this appeal, on December 19, 1988, an 
opinion was filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit which affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Couxrt in 
Trailer Train Co. et al. v. Leuenberaer, No. CV87-L-29 (D. Neb. 
Dec. 11, 1988). That court said in part: 
In [Burlinoton Northern R. Co. v. Bair. 584 F. Supp. 1229 
(S.D. Iowa 1984)] the other centrally assessed taxpayers were 
still subject to the personal property tax as are the 
taxpayers here who are not in agriculturally related 
businesses. The railroad in that case received the same 
"preferential tax treatment" that Trailer Train is accorded 
here. This is because the o:.:er taxpayers are not protected 
by § 306(1)(d). When three-fourths of the commercial and 
industrial personal property in the state is not taxed because 
personal property used in agriculturally-related business is 
exempt* railroads are discriminated against if their personal 
property is taxed. The appropriate remedy, as awarded by the 
trial court, is to enjoin the collection of the discriminating 
tax, even though other taxpayers do not receive the same 
benefits. 
Trailer Train Co. et al. v. Leuenberaer, No. 88-1118, slip. op. at 
7 (8th Cir. Dec. 19, 1988). Following argument of the case in this 
court, the Supreme Court of the United States issued an order on 
May 15, 1989, denying the petition for certiorari filed by the Tax 
Commissioner of Nebraska. Therefore, the Board's argument 
throughout its brief that the judgment of the U.S. District Court 
is not binding in this instance is no longer valid. 
Enron assigns as error: (1) The Board erred in dismissing 
its request for equalization; (2) the Board erred in failing to 
find Enron's pipelines to be personal property and to equalize that 
portion of its correlated unit value with railroads and car 
companies doing business in Nebraska; (3) the Board erred in 
adopting and applying a "blended" or "aggregate" equalization 
ratio, composed of an average of the levels at which all various 
types of property are valued; and (4) the Board erred in failing 
to equalize-Enron's property with unimproved agricultural land. 
Basically, Enron made two requests of the Board. First, it 
contended that its property should be equalized with the property 
of the railroads and car companies operating in Nebraska, which 
were also assessed on a unitary basis. In other words, the final 
judgment of the federal court enjoined the State of Nebraska from 
assessing the personal property of railroads and car companies, 
and Enron insists that it not be taxed on that portion of its unit 
value that represents personal property• In that connection, it 
further argues that its pipelines are personal property and should 
not be assessed. Secondly, Enron did not want the Board to 
equalize its other property with the aggregate level of assessment 
for all property in the state, including centrally assessed 
property such as Enron's which is assessed at 100 percent of actual 
value. 
The Board argues that it lacks authority and jurisdiction to 
consider and act on the issues raised by Enron in the first 
instance, and therefore this court acquired no jurisdiction to 
consider the issues on appeal. In other words, the issues raise 
questions of law, including constitutional issues, and the Board 
insists that it has no authority to consider those issues. 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-505 (Cum. Supp. 1988) requires the Board 
to review the abstracts of assessments of property submitted by the 
county assessors and to equalize such valuations for tax purposes 
within the state. More pertinent to this case, § 77-802 requires 
the Tax Commissioner to determine the total taxable value of a 
public service entity like Enron for each of the local assessing 
districts. The action of the Tax Commissioner, of course, is 
appealable to the Board. This court has stated the Board has a 
wide latitude of judgment and discretion in equalizing assessment 
of property. Citv* of Omaha v. State Board of Equalization & 
Assessment, 181 Neb. 734, 150 N.W.2d 888 (1967). The Board acts 
in a quasi-judicial capacity when equalizing property. Box Butte 
County v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 206 Neb. 696, 
295 N.W.2d 670 (1980). County boards of equalization are required 
to make the initial determination as to whether certain locally 
assessed property is exempt from taxation, which involves a mixed 
question of fact and law. See, e.g., Ev. Luth. Soc. v. fluff*\n 
Ctv. Bd. of Equal, , 230 Neb. 135, 430 N.W.2d 502 (1988); Bethohace 
Com. Servs. v. County Board. 221 Neb, 886, 381 N.W.2d 166 (1986). 
Implicit in the determination of tax exemption, as pointed 
out in Bethphaae, was the application of the facts to 
§ 77-202(1)(c), which provides that exempt from taxation is 
property "owned by . . . religious, charitable . . . organizations 
and used exclusively for . . . charitable . . . purposes . . . .M 
Certainly this involves a mixed question of fact and law and 
involves the quasi-judicial power of the board of equalization. 
In the instant case, there is a difference between Enron being 
able to request equalization with the railroads and car companies 
and Enron being entitled to be equalized with the railroads and car 
companies. It is common sense that Enron cannot be equalized with 
those companies unless it makes a request. It also seems clear 
that to make such a request, Enron must start with the Board, the 
only entity with statutory authority to equalize the valuations of 
centrally assessed taxpayers. As previously stated, our review on 
an appeal such as this is for error appearing in the record, but 
we review questions of law de novo on the record. 
We therefore hold that in an application before the Board, a 
taxpayer may employ any factual or legal argument in support of 
his, her, or its position requesting equalization, subject to the 
final determination of questions of law on a de novo basis by this 
court on appeal. 
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Article VIII, § 1, of the Nebraska Constitution provides in 
relevant part that except for motor vehicles, "[tjaxes shall be 
levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon all tangible 
property . . . .w It would seem that no question exists that if 
the Board arbitrarily undervalues a particular class of property 
so as to make another class of property disproportionately higher, 
or achieves the same result because of legislative action, this 
court: must correct that constitutional inequity by lowering the 
complaining taxpayer's valuation to such an extent so as to 
equalize it with other property in the state. See, Kearney 
Convention Center v. Board of Equal., 216 Neb. 292, 344 N.W.2d 620 
(1984); Banner County v. State Bd. of Equal.. 226 Neb. 236, 411 
N.W.2d 35 (1987). This being the case, no logical reason exists 
why the same requirement of valuation reduction should not be 
imposed when the disproportionality is brought about by a final 
judgment of the federal court exempting the personal property of* 
the railroads and car companies from the imposition of a state tax. 
The state, by not taxing the personal property of railroads 
and car companies, although acting involuntarily and under 
compulsion of federal law, nevertheless, by complying with that 
mandate, has denied Enron equal protection of the law contrary to 
the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
In Sioux Citv Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 43 S. ct. 
190, 67 L. Ed. 340. (1923), the county taxed the bridge company's 
property at actual value while other property in the county was 
assessed at only 55 percent of its value. The bridge company 
alleged this practice violated the equal protection clause of the 
14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
Citing Sunday Lake Iron Co, v. Wakefie^. 247 U.S. 350, 38 S. 
Ct. 495, 62 L. Ed. 1154 (1918), the Court stated: 
"The purpose of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the 
State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary 
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a 
statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted 
agents. And it must be regarded as settled that intentional 
systematic undervaluation by state officials of other taxable 
property in the same class contravenes the constitutional 
right of one taxed upon the full value of his property." 
(Citations omitted.) Sioux Citv Bridge, supra. 260 U.S. at 445. 
The Court held that the taxing of the bridge company's property at 
100 percent of its actual value while other property is taxed at 
55 percent of its actual value violates the equal protection clause 
of the 14th amendment. 
The Court also held that 
the right of the taxpayer whose property alone is taxed at 
100 per cent of its true value is to have his assessment 
reduced to the percentage of that value at which others are 
taxed even though this is a departure from the requirement of 
statute. The conclusion is based on the principle that where 
it is impossible to secure both the standard of the true 
value, and the uniformity and equality required by law, the 
latter requirement is to be preferred as the just and ultimate 
purpose of law. 
260 U.S. at 446. 
As we have previously stated, it makes no difference if the 
undervaluation of the property of the railroad and car companies 
comes about because of deliberate action by the Board, legislative 
enactment, or the final and binding judgment of the federal courts. 
The conclusion remains the same: The equal protection clause of 
the 14th amendment mandates that the same result be reached with 
respect to the personal property of Enron as that in the case of 
the railroad and car companies. 
It therefore becomes necessary to determine whether the 
pipelines of Enron are personal property and thus exempt from 
taxation under the doctrine of Trailer Train Co.. et al. v. 
Leuenberaer. No. CV87-L-29 (D. Neb. Dec. 11, 1987), aff fd No. 
88-1118 (8th Cir. Dec. 19, 1988), cert, denied, Boehm v. Trailer 
Train Co. et al. , U.S. , S. Ct. , 104 L. Ed. 2d 630 
(1989) . 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-103 (Reissue 1986) provides: 
The terms real property, real estate and lands shall 
include city and village lots and all other lands, and all 
buildings, fixtures, improvements, cabin trailers or mobile 
homes which shall have been permanently attached to the real 
estate upon which they are situated, mines, minerals, 
quarries, mineral springs and wells, oil and gas wells, 
overriding royalty interests and production payments with 
respect to oil or gas leases, units of beneficial interest in 
trusts, the corpus of which includes any of the foregoing, and 
privileges pertaining thereto. 
Personal property includes all property other than real property 
and franchises. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-104 (Reissue 1986). The 
issue therefore is whether pipelines are fixtures, and thus real 
property, or are personal property. 
Section 77-103 does not provide a definition for fixtures. 
However, this court in State ex rel. Hever v. Peter^. 191 Neb. 330, 
215 N.W.2d 520 (1974), stated that the common-lav rules relating 
to fixtures are largely codified in § 77-103. 
To determine whether an item constitutes a fixture, this court 
looks at three factors: (1) actual annexation to the realty, or 
something appurtenant thereto, (2) appropriation to the use or 
purpose of that part of the realty with which it is connected, and 
(3) the intention of the party making the annexation to make the 
article a permanent accession to the freehold. Bank of Valley v. 
U.S. Nat. Bank, 215 Neb. 912, 341 N.W.2d 592 (1983); T-V 
Transmission v. County Bd. of Equal.. 215 Neb. 363, 338 N.W.2d 752 
(1983). 
The third factor, the intention to make the article a 
permanent accession to the freehold, is generally regarded as the 
most important factor when determining whether an article is a 
fixture. The other two factors, annexation and appropriation to 
the use of the realty, have value primarily as evidence of such 
intention. See generally Bank of Valley v. U.S. Nat. Bank, supra. 
The intention of the party making the annexation can be inferred 
from the nature of the articles affixed, the relation and situation 
of the party making the annexation, the structure and mode of 
annexation, and tha purpose or use for which the annexation has 
been made. Bank of Valley v. U.S. Nat. Bank, supra: PisK v. 
Fordvce CO-OP Credit Assn.. 225 Neb. 714, 408 N.W.2d 248 (1987); 
Fuel Exploration, Inc. v. Novotnv, 221 Neb. 17, 374 N.W.2d 838 
(1985). 
In this case, the pipelines are buried in the ground. In 
sulphur Springs Val. Elec. COOP, v. city of Tombstone. 1 Ariz. App. 
268, 401 P.2d 753 (1965), affyd 99 Ariz. 110, 407 P.2d 76, the 
-13-
Arizona court had to address whether the pipes, poles, and wires 
that were the chief components of a utility distribution system 
were fixtures and therefore real property that had to be sold at 
public auction. To determine whether an article is a fixture, the 
Arizona courts consider the same three factors this court 
considers. 
The pipes were buried in the ground. The court noted that 
there was no evidence of an agreement between the city and owners 
of the fee that the chattels were to become accessions to the 
realty. The court held that because there was no proof of the 
adaptability to the use for which the real estate was appropriated 
and no proof of an intent by the annexor that the attachment of the 
chattels be permanent, despite annexation to the realty, the 
utility equipment had not lost its character as personal property. 
In considering the issue of annexation when determining 
whether an article is a fixture, some courts have looked at whether 
removal of the article will injure the realty or will injure the 
article itself. Enron quotes at length from one such case. 
In Stem Brothers, Inc. v. Alexandria Township. 6 N.J. Tax 
537 (1984), the question was whether certain underground 
storage tanks were fixtures or personal property. In this 
case, the court focused upon the injury by removal test, and 
stated: "These [the five underground storage tanks] could be 
lifted from the subject property intact just as could be done 
with the 20,000 gallon above-ground tanks and no damage at all 
would occur to the tanks. The only preparatory work that 
would need to be done before the tanks could be lifted onto 
a truck would be removal of the soil covering them. The 
excavation that would result from uncovering one of the 20,000 
gallon tanks would be large. Each such tank is ten feet in 
diameter and 3 0 feet long so that the excavation would have 
to be somewhat longer, wider, and deeper than those 
dimensions. Despite this size, however, such an excavation 
could not in any reasonable sense be said to constitute 
•irreparable1 physical damage to the land because the hole 
could easily be refilled. As a result, the land would be 
virtually the same in all respects as it had been before. The 
sole question, then, is whether the excavation would 
constitute 'serious1 physical damage to the land within the 
meaning of the phrase 'material injury* as used in the 
Business Personal Property Tax Act . • . 
• • • • 
"Some of the factors which might have to be considered 
in determining whether 'serious physical damage' had occurred 
to unimproved land are: (a) any change in the market value 
of the land as a result of the condition; (b) the amount of 
time and the cost required to repair the condition; and (c) 
the hazard or dislocation caused by the condition. 
MI find that no 'serious physical damage1 would be caused 
to plaintiff's land by an excavation to remove the underground 
storage tanks and to restore plaintiff's unpaved parking yard 
to its original state. There is no indication that the value 
of the land would be affected by such an excavation. The 
entire process of removing a tank and restoring the ground to 
its original state would require only two days and would 
create no serious hazard or dislocation. Finally, the cost 
to excavate and refill the hole would be relatively 
insignificant. 
WI therefore conclude that all nine of plaintiff's fuel 
oil storage tanks were business personal property for the tax 
year 1981 and that the tanks should not have been assessed by 
the taxing district for local property tax purposes. 6 N.J. 
Tax at 543." 
Brief for appellants at 26-27. 
Earl Berdine, an Enron employee, testified in his deposition 
that very little damage generally results to the pipe when it is 
removed and that the only damage to the land is "a temporary 
inconvenience while the work is actually going on and then after 
the work is completed the land is restored, put back into its 
original use." 
The second factor, appropriation to the use or purpose of that 
part of the realty with which the article is connected, focuses on 
the relationship between the article and the use which is made of 
the realty to which the article is attached. If the chattel is a 
necessary or useful adjunct to the realty, then it may be said to 
have been appropriated to the use or purpose of the realty to which 
it was affixed. If the chattel is attached for a use which does 
not enhance the value of the land, it is generally deemed not to 
become a part of the land. See 1 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the 
Modern Law of Real Property § 56 (1980). 
The pipeline companies in Yellowstone Pipe Line Co. v. St. 
Bd. of Equal. , 138 Mont. 603, 358 P.2d 55 (1960), cert, denied 366 
U.S. 917, 81 S. Ct. 1095, 6 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1961), were attempting 
to establish that their pipelines were real estate. The pipelines 
were imbedded in real estate rights-of-way obtained from the owners 
of the fee by written conveyance. The State Board of Equalization 
argued that the pipelines did not improve the real estate, served 
no purpose on the land, did not enhance the value of the real 
estate, and could be removed at any time by the company. 
Under Montana case law, if property was placed on land to 
improve it or make it more valuable, it was generally deemed a 
fixture, but if it was attached for a use which did not enhance 
the value of the land, it remained a chattel. Considering the 
estafciisned rules regarding fixtures, the Yellowstone Pipe Li,np rn 
court stated: 
The line could as easily lie on top of the ground were it not 
for the maintenance problem brought on by its exposed position 
and the difficulty of crossing natural and man-made 
obstructions. Does the pipe line improve the land and make 
it more valuable? To the contrary the land makes the pipe 
line more valuable since it removes it from danger of damage 
were it exposed. To what purpose is the pipe line put? it 
is used for the transportation of petroleum products andr in 
our opinion, such use bears no relationship whatever to the 
use of the realty. There can exist here no presumption that 
respondents intended the pipe to become part of the realty 
because the evidence is conclusive that they had no such 
intention. 
Id. at 630-31, 358 P.2d at 69. The court concluded that the 
pipeline is not a fixture. 
As Enron points out in this case, it has the right to remove 
its pipeline and does so on occasion. According to Enron, and we 
agree, the pipeline is not adapted to the use to which the ground 
in which it is embedded is applied. Most of the ground is 
agricultural land, and while the pipe is in place, a farmer or 
rancher may continue to conduct his normal operations. The 
pipeline do0» not improve the land nor make it more valuable. The 
ground is only a foundation upon which the pipes can rest. Use of 
the pipeline bears no relationship to the use of the realty, the 
pipeline being buried in order in part to minimize maintenance. 
Finally, was the intention of Enron to make the article a 
permanent accession to the freehold? 
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In a number of cases, the courts have considered the fact that 
the annexor had an easement as establishing an intent that the 
article remain personal property. In Southwestern Public Service 
Co. v. Chaves County, 85 N.M. 313, 512 P.2d 73 (1973), the court 
had to decide whether certain equipment located on easements, 
including poles and transmission lines, was real estate. The court 
noted that if Southwestern intended the equipment installed on 
unowned land to become part of the realty, Southwestern would, 
under general law, be parting with title to the equipment. The 
court concluded that there was no evidence, of either a subjective 
or objective nature, indicating Southwestern had any such 
intention. To the same effect, see, Sulphur Springs Val. ^^Q?. 
COOP, v. Citv of Tombstone. 1 Ariz. App. 268, 401 P.2d 753 (1965*); 
Liberty Lk. Sewer v. Liberty Lk. Utils.r 37 Wash. App. 809, 683 
P.2d 1117 (1984); In re Mobilife Corp.. 167 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1964). 
The evidence here was that Enron's normal method of operation 
is to obtain easements for purposes of laying its pipelines. Its 
pipeline is generally located on rights-of-way rather than land 
Enron owns in fee. Enron never intended, as we view the record, 
to part with the title to its pipelines by conducting its operation 
in this manner. Furthermore, the evidence discloses that Enron 
retains possession of the pipes for purposes of repair, 
replacement, and recycling if necessary. 
The Board cites only one case in which the court held that 
the gas pipeline of a gas transmission company was not personal 
property but, rather, was real property for tax purposes. Transco. 
Corp. v. Prince William Co.. 210 Va. 550, 172 S.E.2d 757 (1970). 
That court agreed that the chief test to be considered in 
determining whether the chattel has been converted into a fixture 
is the intention of the party making the annexation. We agree, but 
conclude that in the instant case, the intention of Enron was not 
to convert its annexations into fixtures. Consequently, we find 
the pipelines to be personal property. 
Finally, because the unitary value of Enron may include some 
real property, it is necessary that we determine whether that 
portion of its valuation should be based on an aggregate or blended 
ratio, or on the average ratio of unimproved agricultural land. 
In Keamev Convention Center v. Boayd
 9f Equal. . 216 Neb. 292, 
344 N.W.2d 620 (1984), we held that the uniformity clause of the 
Nebraska Constitution required that the complaining taxpayer's land 
had to be valued at 44 percent, the lowest ratio of assessed 
valuation to actual valuation. We had concluded that although the 
taxing authorities may classify different types of property for 
taxation purposes, nevertheless, the results reached by such 
different methods and reasonable classifications must be correlated 
so that the valuations reached shall be uniform and proportionate. 
The record in this case does not support such a favorable finding 
for the Board. 
Although article VIII, § 1, of the Nebraska Constitution was 
amended in 1984 in an attempt to permit the valuation of 
agricultural land by a different method, this court concluded that 
the result must be correlated with the value of all other land. 
At the risk of being redundant, we state that such a result has not 
been reached in this case* 
The Board has asked us to reconsider our decision in Banner 
County v. State Board of Equal., 226 Neb. 236, 411 N.W.2d 35 
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(1987) . There is n^v, • 
nothing to reconsider. Neb. const 
§ 1, Providing that "ft!,v . art* VlI*< 
* "ac [tjaxes shall be ieviflj u 
.'luasaii (emphasis supplied] ,.„ ~->—u: 
l«th a.end.e^
 Co „ s PP •» . to say nothing ot t!). 
-ate s h a U "deny to ' C ° — i o - -ich dlr.et, that ^ 
y Co any Person within i>e ^  
ltS
 '""Action the equal 
r S m a i n v i a b l e
 ^d in fun m 
•"•<*• te^i,
 could be 
T h a ^ bitten m no other way. 
The order of the state Boar-n , 
c e B o a r d
 of Equalization ,nn * 
» — d , a n d t h e c a u s e u " » «"< *••.....« 
Consistent
 w i t h c h i s opinion_ ' " " » " ' " " • ^ not 
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR 
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. 
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